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Abstract:   
The year 2011 has witnessed a lot of high profiles data breaches despite the availability of IS 
security and governance controls, frameworks, standards and models for  organisations to choose 
from; and the technical advances made in intrusion prevention and detection. Taking  this issue 
into account the objective of this paper is to identify and analyse the weaknesses in the IS 
security defences of organisations from a holistic perspective, and propose a dynamic IS security 
governance process model for the implementation of appropriate controls and mechanisms for 
optimised IS security. Optimization is achieved through the strategic overlap of security and 
governance frameworks implemented in a prioritized phased manner for efficiency and 
effectiveness in cost, time and effort. The paper starts with the analysis of data breaches to 
identify the weaknesses in the organisational information system. This is followed by the 
analysis of recommended requirements and dimensions of  effective IS security architecture, IS 
governance, concepts and models to identify relevant frameworks used in IS security and 
governance. Thereafter, the best practices for implementing the model is evaluated and finally 
the frameworks and IS entities are integrated into an optimized Information Systems Security 
and Governance (ISSG) process model.  
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Information system is  critical not only for the efficient and effective functioning of an 
organisation, but have also become the custodian of sensitive customer and corporate 
information raising legal, regulatory and ethical issues. Hence, any disruption or breach into the 
organizational network affects all stakeholders. The embrace of cloud computing and 
outsourcing have compounded the security threat since confidential information  is stored in 
remote servers on the Internet. Morever, the high profile and persistent IS security breaches in 
2011 in  Sony, the data-security firm RSA, Lockheed Martin, the email wholesaler Epsilon, the 
Fox broadcast network, NASA, PBS, the European Space Agency, the FBI, the British and 
French treasuries, Citigroup, and other organisations  (Liebowitz, 2011) have exposed the 
weakness of the current IS security model and architecture, in preventing intrusions into 
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organisational networks. These breaches have sent the message that technical controls are not 
sufficient to prevent breaches as hackers have found ways to bypass the organizational IS 
security defenses by using a combination of social–technical methods. 
 
2. IS Security Breaches 
The data breach at RSA, Sony and Epsilon occurred due to spear phishing rather than highly 
sophisticated hacking. Spear phishing is a type of attack using a technique commonly known as 
Advanced Persistent Threats (APT), where the attacks target individual employees rather than 
organizational security defenses. One simple flaw or oversight by the employee is all that is 
required for entry into  these defenses. When it comes to APTs it is not about how safe, secure 
and good the company is, but that a totally new approach for entering the organization is selected 
where the attacker does not  bother to hack the organization and its infrastructure, but rather 
focus on hacking the employees and then escalate the privileges. According to a key manager at 
RSA, technological advances in IS security and the use of IS security controls/frameworks, and 
compliance on IS security regulations have prevented the IS security breaches to a great extent. 
However, on March 17
th
 2011 a data breach occurred in RSA which provides security, risk, and 
compliance solutions for most of the Fortune 500 companies for managing their security. Unlike 
other data breaches, no customer data like email addresses, usernames, credit card numbers, date 
of birth or social security numbers were stolen. The attackers used a common form of phishing 
called spear phishing where they  sent two different phishing emails over a two-day period. The 
two emails were sent to two small groups of lower level employees with the email subject “2011 
Recruitment Plan.” The email went to the junk folder, but one employee retrieved it from the 
junk mail folder, and open the attached excel file. It was a spreadsheet titled “2011 Recruitment 
plan.xls. The spreadsheet contained a zero-day exploit (are exploits for vulnerabilities that are  
not yet publicly known) that installed a backdoor through an Adobe Flash vulnerability. The 
attacker then proceeded to install a remote administration tool (a variant of Poison Ivy set in 
reverse mode) that allows the attacker to control the machine. In this reverse connect mode the 
victim machine reaches out and connect to the command and control rather than the other way 
around bypassing the firewall state table. Once this was set up, the attacker started digital 
shoulder surfing to establish the employee‟s role and their level of access (Rivner, 2011). 
According to various sources, the estimated cost to the company through this attack is $ 66 
million in direct and attributable costs (ibid). It was revealed that a similar methodology was 
used in the case of Sony PlayStation data breach  where it was suspected that the hackers used 
spear phishing to enter the network and take control of the PC of a system administrator, who 
had rights to access sensitive information about Sony's customers. They did that by sending the 
administrator an email message that contained a piece of malicious software that got downloaded 
onto his or her PC. An analysis of these breaches reveal, that if a few non-technical procedures 
were followed, majority of these breaches could have been avoided, pointing to the fact that 
relying on technical controls alone may not be effective.   
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Statistics on data breaches from various sources point to the severity of the situation.  Resources 
from these sources are taken and analyzed to view the trend and weaknesses in networks. 
Identity Theft Resource Center (ITRC, 2011), a not for profit organisation  tracking data 
breaches in the United States , reported that hacking accounted for the largest number of 
breaches in the first quarter of 2011, as almost 37% of breaches were due to malicious attacks on 
computer systems which is more than double the amount of targeted attacks (17.1%) reflected in 
the 2010 ITRC Breach List. By the end of 2011 (December 31
st
 2011), there has been 414 
reported breaches with 22,945,773 records compromised in 2011, and this does not include the 
breaches not reported, veiled from public and unknown. The last five years (2007 to 2011) 
statistics is shown in table -1, and illustrated in figure -1 and figure -2 (ITRC, 2007, 2008, 2009, 
2010, 2011).    
 
Year Breaches No. of records 
2007 65            3,997,133  
2008 97            7,311,833  
2009 498        223,146,989  
2010 662          16,167,542  
2011 414          22,945,773  
Table -1 Data breaches in organisations  
 
Figure -1 Number of data breaches 
While the ITRC statistics (based on publicly reported cases only) point to the decrease in the 
number of breaches, at the same time the increase in the number of records from each breach, 
point to the increase in severity of the breach.  The year 2009 is an exception since 206 million 
records was breached from two cases alone (Heartland Payment and US Military of 130 and 76 



















Figure – 2 Number of records breached 
The  largest breach on record,  the Heartland  Payment Systems (a PCI DSS compliant 
transaction processing company transacting US $ 80 billion) attack, was a technical one using 
SQL injection through a vulnerability in the code written eight years ago for the web form. This 
allowed access to Heartland‟s corporate network, according to Robert Russo, general manager of 
the PCI Security Council (Vijayan 2010). This vulnerability was not identified through annual 
internal and external audits of Heartland‟s systems or through continuous internal system-
monitoring procedures. This provided a means to extend the compromise from the corporate 
network to the separate payment processing network (Cheney, 2010). The attack went unnoticed 
for six months while the attackers continued their nefarious activities in the network. According 
to Verizon 2011 report, 96% of the breaches were avoidable through simple or intermediate 
controls. A list of reported breaches in organisations (from January to August 2011) where more 
than 100,000 records compromised (given in figure 3) is analyzed to find out the factors behind 
the breaches which shed light on the issues to consider to provide a robust model of IS security 
(source: ITRC, 2011).   
Out of the 20 reported breaches, the largest of these was reported by TRICARE SAIC on Sept. 
14. It happened when the backup tapes containing electronic health care records used in the 
military health system to capture patient data from 1992 through Sept. 7, 2011, in San Antonio-
area military treatment facilities was lost. Table 2 presents results based on the analyses of the 











 Organisation Nature of breach Evaluation 
1 TRICARE-SAIC Backup tapes containing SAIC SAIC data 
stolen from the car of a Tricare employee. 
Non-technical – employee error; 
procedure not followed 
2 Texas Comptroller Unencrypted information transferred and 
kept in a server accessible to the public 
Correct procedure not followed when 
transferring information across 
servers 
3 Betfair SQL injection attack on a code 
vulnerability 
Technical breach, procedure not 
followed especially network 
segregation and file integrity 
monitoring.  
4 Health Net IBM Nine server drives went missing from the 
data centre of the California office of 
Health Net 
Appropriate policies and procedures 
were not been followed by those 
responsible for both the physical and 
logical protection of critical data.  
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Nemours Children Health System
Oregon Department of Motor Vehicles
Wellpoint Anthem
Eisenover Medical Centre
Cambridge Who's Who Publishing
Citigroup
Cord Blood Registry
South California Medical Legal Consultants
Massachussets Executive Office
Restaurant Depot
San Fransisco Public Utilities Commission
Virginia Commonwealth University
Accendo Insurance
Laredo Independent School District
Oklahoma State Dept of Health
Number of records compromised 
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5 Jacobi Medical 
Centre 
The files (cassette tapes in a box)  was 
stolen from a van operated by GRM 
Information Management Services, when 
the driver left the van unattended and 
unlocked.  
Correct procedure not followed prior 
to and  when transporting storage 
media  
6 Nemours Children 
Health System  
Unencrypted computer backup tapes 
containing patient billing and employee 
payroll data stolen from a Nemours facility 
in Wilmington, Delaware  
Correct procedure not followed when 
storing storage media. As per the 
control, the tapes were supposed to 
be safely locked 
7 Oregon 
Department of 
Motor Vehicles  
USB or CD containing personal 
information lost from the department. 
Thief caught.  
Correct procedure were not followed 
when storing/disposing redundant 
data 
8 WellPoint Anthem A flaw in the website allowed hackers to 
manipulate the web address within the site 
to gain access to applicants' information. 
An upgrade to the server caused the 
vulnerability, but it was later 
revealed that security measures were 




The computer used to check-in patients at 
the Center in Rancho Mirage was stolen 
from the open lobby area 
Correct procedure not followed. The 
computer was not protected with any 
sort of drive encryption mechanisms, 
and not physically locked.  
10 Cambridge 
Publishing  
The data tapes was stolen or lost by an 
outsourced company when the drive (with 
the tape inside) was sent for repair to the 
outsourced company  
Correct auditing procedure not 
followed when repairing storage 
media. Tape kept inside the drive by 
mistake. 
11 Citigroup The attackers logged into Citi's consumer 
website for credit-card holders using 
legitimate accounts and they changed 
characters in their Web browsers' address 
fields to move around to new accounts. 
Thereafter it was suspected that they 
automated the process, writing a short 
program to cycle through possible account 
numbers and capture the data displayed in 
the browser window for each one 
(Wagenseil, 2011). 
Technical flaw. If the bank  had used 
a method other than the account 
number to identify the account to the 
browser, the breach could have been 
avoided. 
12 Cord Blood 
Registry 
A computer along with the backup tapes 
containing member personal and financial 
information were stolen from an 
employee's locked car. 
Correct procedure not followed when 
storing/transporting storage media  
13 Southern California 
Medical-Legal 
Consultants 
Personal medical data were available 
online in an unsecured format and could be 
accessed through Internet searches.  
Technical flaw. SCMLC President 
admitted that their internal  security 
policies and procedures were not 




A variation of the persistent virus W 32. 
QAKBOT infected 1,500 computers at the 
agency‟s offices and career centers 
Procedures on using portable storage 
devices, download of files and 
clicking on suspicious web links 
could have prevented the breach. 
15 Restaurant Depot Hacking - cybercriminals placed malware Technical breach by expert hackers 
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onto the credit and debit card processing 
systems used in Restaurant Depot's stores, 
harvested the stolen data and sent it to a 
server in Russia.  
16 San Francisco 
Public Utilities 
Commission 
The incident involved a server housing 
sensitive data got infected with malware. "  
The server was open onto the Internet and 
had an encoded file with customer data.   
Technical breach. Procedures were 
not followed. It was speculated that 
hackers might have injected malware 
through an open port on the server . 
The file was not encrypted and the 




According to forensic reports hackers 
accessed the system from an IP address 
within US and planted malware on one 
server (outside the firewall) which infected 
another server (containing sensitive data 
inside the firewall) and created two 
accounts  
Technical breach. Breach discovered 
on 24
th
 October. Analysis still going 
on regarding the cause 
18 Accendo Insurance Personal information may have been 
exposed during  mailings of transition fill 
letters to physicians. While the mailings 
were addressed correctly and received by 
the recipients, a formatting change shifted 
the text of the letters, showing some lines 
of text through the envelope window. 
Non-technical error, attributed to 
formatting of letters while drafting 
and sent to printer 
19 Laredo Independent 
School District 
A disk holding personal information  
current and former students in the Laredo 
Independent School District has gone 
missing/lots in transit.  
Non-technical error, when standard 
encryption and data media transport 
policy was not enforced. The school 
doesn‟t know who has signed off the 
disk to be sent.  
20 Oklahoma State 
Dept of Health 
Department laptop which contained client 
personal information was stolen from the 
car of OSDH‟s employee in broad 
daylight.  
 
Procedure not followed for transport 
of electronic and storage devices 
along public places. A Simple laptop 
encryption software could have 
mitigated the risk  
Table -2 Analysis of the top twenty breaches 
A review of these twenty cases reveal that sophisticated hacking took place only in four cases 
(numbers 3, 15, 16 and 17) compromising only 20% of the cases with 13.73% of the 20.81 
million records (in the top 20 listed in figure -3) breached. Technical error resulted in 15% of the 
cases with 6.05% of total records breached. Compared to these two technical attacks, non-
technical errors (which could not have been prevented through normal network security 
defenses) accounted for 65% of the cases with 80.22% of total records breached. This means that  
13 out of 20 breaches or 16.6 million out of 20.81 million record breach could have been 
prevented by implementing and following relevant IS security and governance controls.   
Expanding the statistics from the sample of twenty cases to the entire 414 reported breaches, 
reveal that breaches in 269 out of 414 organizations could have avoided. Converting this into 
financial terms, the above figure and loss statistics of Ponemon Institute (2011) is taken for 
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analysis. They estimated that the annualized cost of cybercrime to an organizations is $5.9 
million per year (based on the median annualized cost for 50 benchmarked organizations); which 
in the ITRC cases, amount to $1587 million (269.1 x $5.9 million) saved by following simple 
procedures. If those organisations that had been breached, but not reported or veiled from public 
have been included, the savings in US alone can be staggering. To evaluate whether this amount 
($1587 million) is realistic another statistic is taken to compute the values. According to 
Forrester Research, (Gaudin, 2007) the cost of breach of a record which  includes outside legal 
fees, notification costs, increased call center costs, marketing and PR costs, and discounted 
product offers falls between  $90 and $ 305. This amounts to (20.81 million x $90 - $ 305 = $ 
1872 to $ 6347 million (the conservative figure $ 1872 million comes close to the previous 
calculated amount).   
In a survey on UK business on IS security (by the UK Government Department for Business 
Enterprise and Regulatory Reform and PriceWaterhouseCoopers in 2008), it was revealed that 
45% of the companies  with less than 50 staff;  72% with more than 250 staff and 96% of the 
companies with more than 500 staff have suffered a security incident in the previous year. This 
comes to an average of 71% of companies being subjected to a security incident. Regarding the 
cost of responding to an attack Ponemon Institute (2011) found that from 2010 to 2011, the time 
and cost required to respond to security breaches has increased from 14 days in 2010 to 18 days 
in 2011 with an average daily cost of attacks increasing from $17,600 to nearly $23,000. 
Incorporating the PWC research statistics of 71% of the entire companies in UK having 
experienced an attack to the tune of $17000 to $23000 the total amount spent/lost is staggering.    
An overview of analysis of threats from various sources, reveal the extent of threat. In the year 
2010 alone Symantec encountered more than 286 million unique variants of malware; 93% 
increase in the volume of Web-based attacks in 2010 over the volume observed in 2009 and an 
average of 260,000 identities exposed in each of the data breaches caused by hacking (Symantec, 
2011). Symantec also reported a 42% rise in the number of reported new mobile operating 
system vulnerabilities (from 115 to 163), 6253 new vulnerabilities, and 14 new zero day 
vulnerabilities in applications such as Internet Explorer, Adobe Reader, and Adobe Flash Player.   
The 2011 Verizon data breach investigation report conducted by the Verizon Risk team, the US 
Secret Service and the Dutch High Tech Crime Unit reveals that most of the data breaches in 
organizations in 2010 are not the result of highly sophisticated attacks, but rather the victims are 
a target of opportunity  than choice (Verizon, 2011). Moreover, according to Verizon almost all 
breaches are avoidable without difficult or expensive corrective action. In the year 2010 Verizon  
reported  that 83% of victims were targets of opportunity, 92% of attacks were not highly 
difficult, 76% of all data was compromised from servers, 86% were discovered by a third party, 
96% of breaches were avoidable through simple or intermediate controls, and 89% of victims 
subject to PCI-DSS had not achieved compliance.    
These points to the fact that implementing security mechanism alone is not sufficient to prevent 
data breaches as technical, non-technical controls and best practices in information security and 
governance is required to provide optimized rather than adequate protection. For instance, in the 
9 
 
case of the Betfair data breach (Amsel, 2011), the forensic investigation report prepared by the 
digital security consultants - Information Risk Management concluded that:  
“Information security was not implemented in accordance with best practice … 
appropriate information security governance is not in place within Betfair and as a 
consequence the business has been exposed to significant risks … appropriate technical 
controls relating to such elements as network segregation and file integrity monitoring 
that would provide Betfair the ability to deter, prevent and detect such an incident are not 
in place.” 
To find out the reasons for the persistent attacks and weakness in IS security it is imperative to 
look at the actual  issues facing IS security managers from their perspective and get 
recommendations/requirements for an efficient and effective security architecture.   
 
3. Issues and Requirements in IS Security 
Data breaches and hacking through carelessness in following procedures and controls have 
emerged as a serious and growing issue in organisations and personal computers alike. Hence it 
is worthwhile to look at the IS security issues facing organisations to substantiate this. Two 
studies are taken for analysis, one a global study of 874 IS security certified professionals 
worldwide, and the other a study of 623 US based IS security professional who re-ranked the 
same issues (Knapp, Marshall, Rainer & Morrow, 2008). Both the surveys came up with a 
ranked list of 25 information security issues (see table 3).  
An analysis of the issues based on matching the issues in the top five in both the surveys reveal 
top three common issues four issues namely: 
i. Top management support 
ii. Malware attacks like viruses, Trojans and worms 
iii. User awareness and training 
Here non-technical issues like top management support and, user awareness and training 
comprise two third of the top three issues facing managers followed by malware attacks implying 
the importance  of these two issues in preventing malware attacks.  Overall, the issues can be 
categorized into technical, non-technical, and those that are both technical as well as non-
technical in nature (table – 4) that may reveal the extent of support that IT personnel personal 
have to give to technical as well as non-technical issues in ensuring an effective IT security 
environment.  
The evaluation of the major issues supports the need for a broader perspective of IS security 
incorporating IT governance (which includes all the non-technical issues, and some technical 
issues given in table -4). This points to the need to look at IS security from a non- technical 
perspective as well.  This necessitates a review of IS security and governance controls available 
and employed, to evaluate where these can fit into current IS security domain and to  analyse the 
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available IS security models to see how these can be integrated into an optimized IS security 
governance framework 
 
 Global Study (874 respondents)  US study (623 respondents) 
1 Top management support 1 Top management support 
2 User awareness training & education 2 Legal & regulatory issues 
3 Malware  3 Malware 
4 Patch management 4 User awareness training & education 
5 Vulnerability & risk management 5 Protection of privileged information 
6 Policy related issues (enforcement) 6 Business continuity & disaster preparation 
7 Organisational culture 7 Low funding & inadequate budgets 
8 Access control & identity management  8  Lack of skilled security workforce 
9 Internal threats 9 Fighting spam 
10 Business continuity & disaster preparation 10 Inherent insecurity of networks & information systems 
11 Low funding & inadequate budgets 11 Standards issues 
12 Protection of privileged information 12 Vulnerability & risk management 
13 Network security architecture 13 Policy related issues (enforcement) 
14 Security training for IT staff 14 Security training for IT staff 
15 Justifying security expenditure 15 Governance 
16 Inherent insecurity of networks & information systems 16 Patch management 
17 Governance 17 Access control & identity management 
18 Legal & regulatory issues 18 Justifying security expenditure 
19 External connectivity to organisational networks 19 Network security architecture 
20 Lack of skilled security workforce 20 Organisational culture 
21 Systems development & life cycle support 21 Internal threats 
22 Fighting spam 22 Systems development & life cycle support 
23 Firewall & IDS configurations 23 Wireless vulnerabilities 
24 Wireless vulnerabilities 24 External connectivity to organisational networks 
25 Standards issues 25 Firewall & IDS configurations 
Table 3: A comparative study of IS security issues globally and in US 
Technical Non-technical Both 
Malware Top management support Vulnerability & risk management  
Patch management  User awareness training & education  Internal threats  
Access control & identity mngmt Policy related issues (enforcement) Protection of privileged information 
Network security architecture  Organisational culture  Inherent insecurity of networks & 
information systems  
Fighting spam  Business continuity & disaster 
preparation  
External connectivity to 
organisational networks  
Firewall & IDS configurations  Low funding & inadequate budgets Systems development & life cycle 
support 
Wireless vulnerabilities  Security training for IT staff  
 Justifying security expenditure   
 Governance   
 Legal & regulatory issues   
 Lack of skilled security workforce   
 Standards issues   




4. Optimized Perspective of IS Security  
The term „optimal‟ refers to the relevant components of „requirements‟ and „dimensions‟ for an 
organisation thus creating a synergic (multiple) effect through mapping and appropriate 
integration. IS security problems cost millions of dollars for US companies and billions for the 
overall US economy and the question is not whether organizations need more security, but to 
look at cost-benefit methods to evaluate IT security to „optimize‟ security countermeasure 
investments and reduce spending without sacrificing protection (Arora,  et al., 2004). 
Incorporating the requirements and dimensions of information systems security effectiveness 
results in an optimized information security governance model  
 
 Requirements Methods to achieve this requirement 
1 Be holistic and encompassing Incorporate and integrate industry relevant security and IT 
governance frameworks   
2 Make suggestions on how different 
controls can be synchronised to 
achieve maximum effect 
Synchronization can be achieved through mapping the 
different controls to achieve a synergic effect.   
3 Include a comprehensive approach 
to information security risk 
management 
Using risk management framework like the RiskIT approach 
by ISACA  
4 Follow a predetermined life-cycle 
approach 
Apply a PDCA cycle as stated in ISO 27001. ISO IEC 27001 
uses the Plan-Do-Check-Act model. Plan in section - 4, Do in 
section -5, Check in section – 6 and 7, Act in section – 8.  
5 Be measurable Using multi-dimensional measurement methods instead of just 
a tick it approach. According to CSI Computer Crime and 
Security Survey 2010/2011 (2011), many respondents named 
tools that would improve their visibility—better log 
management, security information and event management, 
security data visualization, security dashboards and the like.  
Table – 5: IS Security Architecture  
 
The high incidence of security breaches in organizations could be attributed to the organization‟s 
inability to adequately focus on non-technical issues in information systems security, namely  
policies, procedures, practices, and strategies that, organizations normally put in place to 
minimize threats (Dhillon and Backhouse 2001; Straub and Welke 1998; and Siponen, 2005 
cited in Ifendo, 2009). This necessitates an ever increasing need to manage IS security from a 
multidimensional, holistic and comprehensive manner for ensuring a secure IS environment 
(Solms, 2001). Moreover   IS security need to be built like a staircase of combined measures 
(Hagen, Albrechtsen and Howden, 2008) as  various dimensions of IS security are mutually 
dependent on each other (Sundt, 2006; Berghel, 2005 cited in Hagen, Albrechtsen and Howden, 
2008). Elof & Elof, (2005) have proposed an integrated architectural approach to information 
and computer security that operates in a distributed, heterogeneous and multidisciplinary 
business environment. They have given five requirements for the architecture (table -5):  
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From the breaches mentioned in section - 1 it is evident that a security awareness culture and use 
of appropriate success factors implementing relevant frameworks is lacking in the affected 
organisations. This necessitates the need for extended requirements to include a security culture 
and implementation success factors. Researchers have proposed a information security-aware 
culture to minimise risks to information (Veiga & Elof, 2010; Niekerk & Solms, 2010). Hence, 
an additional requirement (requirement -6) is to create and implement a continuous organisation 
specific dynamic security awareness and training program. While frameworks are in itself best 
practices for implementing IS security standards and complying with regulations, proper 
implementation is required to make the model successful. The data breaches and attacks have 
proved that despite the presence of IS security and governance frameworks, breaches have 
happened (Eg: Heartland Payment  Systems Breach the largest breach reported since 2008 was 
PCI DSS compliant and certified). This requires following industry specific critical success 
factors and best practices in implementation (requirement – 7) of relevant standards. Success 
factors have been proposed for IT governance implementation namely the 33 ITG best practices 
(Grembergen and Haes, 2009) and ITIL best practices (Pederson et. al.,  2010; Iden & 
Langeland, 2010, Tan, Cater-Steel & Toleman, 2009).  
Elof & Elof (2005) regard IS security as a multidisciplinary concept cutting across several 
related disciplines. In this respect Solms (2001, p. 504)  stated that “if information security is not 
addressed in a holistic and comprehensive way, taking all its dimensions into account, real risks 
exist preventing a really secure environment”. In this respect, Solms proposed a 
multidimensional character of information security, incorporating twelve dimensions focusing on 
governance, audit, legal, technical, human and measurement areas that need to work together for 
creating a secure IS environment.   
Table 6 illustrates the 12 dimensions and the corresponding frameworks/models/acts. In a global 
survey on 834 business executives and heads of information technology (IT) covering 21 
countries and 10 industries on the control frameworks used in enterprise governance of IT, 28% 
of those surveyed use ITIL/ISO 20000, 21.1% use ISO 27000/related security frameworks, 
15.1% use Six Sigma, 12.9% use COBIT, 12.7% use PMI/PMBOK, and 12% use RiskIT 
framework of Information Systems Audit and Control Association (ISACA), along with other 
frameworks (ITGI, 2011). Out of these, only Six Sigma and PMI/PMBOK are less oriented 
towards IT security and governance. While the above controls are IT governance oriented 
encompassing IT security, PCI DSS is a standard focusing purely on the technical aspects of 










Dimensions Available frameworks 
Strategic/corporate 
governance 
Commonly used frameworks are  ITIL/ISO 20000, ISO 27000 and 
related security frameworks, Six Sigma, COBIT, PMI/PMBOK, 
RiskIT, and other related frameworks (ITGI, 2011)  
Governance/ 
organisational  
Evident in the four domains of COBIT and encompass the IS in the 
organisation 
Policy IS Security policy endorsed in COBIT, ISO 27K series, NIST, ITIL  
Best practice  33 ITG best practices (Grembergen and Haes, 2009); ITIL best practices 
(Pederson et. al.,  2010; Iden & Langeland, 2010) 
Ethical Extended Information Systems Secure Interconnection (ISSI) model (Leiwo 
& Heikkuri, 1998)  address the ethical aspect of IS security  
Certification Certifications available for  COBIT, ITIL, ISO  
Legal Regulations like FISMA, HIPAA, SOX relate to IS security  
Insurance (Relevant only for insurance companies )  
Personnel/human 
resource 
Taken care of in relevant section/controls in COBIT, ITIL, ISO 27002 
controls  
Awareness Information Security Culture Framework (Veiga & Eloff, 2010; Schlienger 
& Teufel, 2003) 
Technical PCI DSS 2.0 & ITIL are more technical in nature than COBIT     
Measurement/metrics Guidelines given in COBIT, ISO 27004 & ITIL – as metrics, goals, key 
performance indicators, key goals indicators, and maturity model in COBIT. 
Audit COBIT is an IS audit tool. Moreover European Union selected COBIT as an 
auditing standard for IT Security (Summerfield, 2005)  
Table – 6: Dimensions of IS security mapped with related IS control frameworks/standards 
5. Role of Governance in IS Security 
Since IT governance is an integral part of  IT Secuirity  (Elof & Elof, 2005;  Solms, 2001),  the 
definition and management of IT security is analysed to view its role. Information security 
management is defined as “the process of administering people, policies, and programs with the 
objective of assuring continuity of operations while maintaining strategic alignment with the 
organisational mission” (Cazemer  et al. 2000, cited in Choobineh, et al., p. 959) while the 
management of information security is primarily concerned with strategic, tactical, and 
operational issues surrounding the planning, analysis, design, implementation and maintenance 
of the IS security program (Choobineh, Dhillon, Grimaila & Rees, 2007). The definition and 
management not only provides a very broad meaning taking into account technical, non-
technical and strategic aspects of IS security, it emphasizes maintaining the IS operations with 
the objective of IS security management as being strategic alignment in nature.  This strategic 
alignment of linking IS security mission and goals with the organizational strategic mission and 
goals is the prime objective of IT governance. Moreover, in a global survey of 7000 IT 
professionals, the importance of strategic alignment of organisational goals with the IT goals was 
cited by 90% of the surveyed as vital to organisation (ITGI, 2006; ITGI, 2008). Thus it can be 
safely assumed that the effective implementation of information security involves, using a 
strategic mix of the IT governance frameworks, (that aligns the IT goals with the organisational 
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goals), IT service management framework (that maintain efficient and effective continuity of 
operations), along with compliance with relevant security standards (policies and programs).    
While it has been emphasised that governance is a key to success in setting standards, success is 
more likely if the governance structure includes all of the various interests in the network, and 
moreover the standards (ex. ISO 27 K, PCI DSS, ISO 20000) themselves need to be effective yet 
flexible enough to satisfy competitive interests (Sullivan, 2010). In this respect Solms (2001, p. 
504) have argued that “if information security is not addressed in a holistic and comprehensive 
way, taking all its dimensions into account, real risks exist preventing a really secure 
environment”. The effective and efficient utilization of information technology requires the 
alignment of the IT strategies with the business strategies (Luftman, Lewis & Oldach, 1993; 
Luftman & Brier, 1999). Since alignment of IT strategies with the business strategies is the 
objective of IT governance, it is worthwhile to view security from an IT governance lens taking 
into account the internal and external issues that impact IS security. In this respect, information 
security should not be perceived as a technical issue alone, but as a business and governance 
challenge that involves adequate risk management, reporting, and accountability. Thus apart 
from securing information systems assets organisations have the extra role of complying with 
mandatory and voluntary standard and regulations imposed by external entities. Hence it is 
worthwhile to view IS security from a compliance and assurance perspective.  According to 
Bishop (2003) security has three components namely requirements, policy and mechanisms.  
Ponemon Institute‟s (2011) study of 160 senior managers in a sample of 46 multinational 
organizations revealed that the average cost of compliance was $3,529,570 while the cost 
incurred due to non-compliance was $9,368,351. This amounted to a net savings of $ 5,838,781 
($9,368,351-$3,529,570) for compliant companies. Thus, the non-compliance cost is 2.65 times 
the cost of compliance. Since compliance to a variety of information security standards is 
mandated by regulations, organisations need to act and implement a proactive information 
security enforcement strategy (Madan & Madan, 2010). 
 
6.  IT Control Frameworks for IS Security 
Information Security Governance, which is an important component of the IT governance and an 
integral part of the enterprise governance, could be regarded as implementing the governance 
concepts and principles on information security issues (Abu-Musa, 2010) (ibid). While a “control 
framework is a recognised system of control categories that covers all internal controls expected 
in an organisation” (IIARF 2002, cited in Liu & Ridley, 2005, p. 2), an internal control provides 
reasonable assurance regarding the achievement of objectives in the area of effectiveness and 
efficiency of operations, reliability of financial reporting and compliance with regulations 
(Pathak, 2003). Internal controls are policies, procedures, practices, and organisational structures 
put in place to reduce risks (Kim, et al., 2008). Currently implementations of IS control 
frameworks are on the rise worldwide, due to compliance and regulatory requirements to various 
regulations and standards.  
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In a survey of security professionals, the Enterprise Strategy Group (ESG) discovered that 72 
percent of North American organizations with 1,000 or more employees have implemented one 
or more formal IT best-practice control and process models (Turner et al., 2009). Among these, 
the study stated that the most widely used commercial IT control frameworks are ITIL, ISO 
27002 and COBIT, which provide optimal security management. Furthermore, it had been stated 
that ISO/IEC 27002, COBIT, ISO 20000, and ITIL are the most applicable and widely used 
standards to manage and maintain IT services (Sahibudin, Sharifi & Ayat, 2009). IT control 
implementers use, ITIL to define strategies, plans and processes, COBIT for metrics, 
benchmarks and audits and, ISO/IEC 27002 to address security issues to mitigate the risks (ibid).  
Considering the more technical security aspects of protecting cardholder data, the requirements 
set by PCI DSS are in line with the IT security best practices required by widely recognised 
standards such as ISO 27002, and COBIT (Laredo, 2009). Gikas (2010) did a mapping of ISO 
27000 with the PCI DSS and found out 70 similar technical controls between these two 
standards. PCI DSS is a regulatory requirement that is mandatory for those dealing with credit 
cards to ensure the protection of cardholder data; ISO 27002 is a non-regulatory code of practice 
for information security (ISO, 2011); and ISO/IEC 20000 (an internal requirement), is the first 
international standard for IT Service Management implemented through ITIL. On the other hand, 
COBIT address the business issues namely company-wide principles, goals and needs in terms of 
information processing through its various controls in the four domains of IS (Humphreys et al., 
cited in Posthumous & Solms, 2004).  In the case of a risk-based approach to IS security, ISACA 
has released the Risk IT Framework (ISACA, 2009) as a framework to identify, govern and 
manage information technology risks. This framework fills the gap between generic (non–technical) 
risk management frameworks and technical (security-related) IT risk management frameworks. 
 
7. Optimized IS Security Governance (ISSG) Implementation Model  
An optimized IS security governance model takes into account the following (based on mapping 
the overlapped extended requirements outlined in table 5 and dimensions in table 6): 
1. A holistic approach to IS security incorporating the comprehensive non-technical aspects 
of corporate/IS governance encompassing the entire IS in the organisation, as well as 
technical enough to ensure layered and detailed protection to organisational information 
assets; 
2. An effective and ethical IS security policy that complies with the legal and regulatory 
requirements;  
3. Synchronizing and mapping relevant IS security and governance control frameworks for 
efficiency, effectiveness and synergy; 
4. Viewing IT governance security from a risk based perspective using the Risk IT 
framework or similar approach;  
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5. Following a life cycle approach to implementation incorporating industry specific 
dynamic success factors before, during and after implementation   
6. Making sure that the people involved in IT and business share a common security culture 
through continuous multi-level optimally crafted technical and non-technical training. 
7. A multilevel multidimensional aggregated dashboard for tracking and monitoring IS 
security governance entities using more than one metric.     
IS security governance is an ongoing process due to external factors like the dynamic nature of 
security threats, technological advances and changes/introduction of IS related regulations and 
internal factors namely the dynamic change in strategic direction,  change/update of IS assets, 
and personnel movement and turnover. Thus, a dynamic process model is preferred to  a static 
model. Based on the seven components, the Figure – 6 provides the process of implementing the 
optimized ISSG model.  
 
Figure -4 ISSG Implementation Process Model 
The central focus of the security model is to manage IS security risk through a risk- based 
approach. Since the IS security and governance domain includes different frameworks that 
overlap there are hundreds of controls to choose from that may put undue burden on the 
organisation in terms of cost, effort and time. Hence, a prioritized systematic approach of 
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rather than maximum controls, since 100% IS security is an utopian thought.  The ISSG model 
thus rides on:  
  a common set of mandatory controls,  
followed by,  
 a set of heavily overlapped critical controls,  
 a set of partially overlapped industry benchmarked controls,  
 a set of recommended controls and 
 a set of preferred controls.      
 
 
Figure – 5: Prioritized IS Control Implementation   
The ISSG process model should initially focus mainly on the mandatory controls for regulatory 
compliance and then based on the industry and strategic direction, choose to follow other set of 
controls. Financial sector may choose to follow all the set of controls listed below while 
organisation in the hospitality sector may choose to follow the mandatory and critical controls 
only. Since, controls are common across frameworks and levels, these five sets of controls can 
again overlap with each other presenting a final set of customized controls.   
IS security governance is continuous process due to the highly dynamic nature of the information 
technology sector and the advances made by IS security defense technologies and hackers alike.  
ISO 27001 reiterates this and incorporates several Plan-Do-Check-Act (PDCA) cycles where the 
IS  controls are regarded as a continuous activity that is reviewed and adjusted to take account of 
changes in the security threats, vulnerabilities and impacts of information security failures. Thus, 
the implementation process of ISSG follows the PDCA cycle of Deming where relevant 
frameworks/standards followed by appropriate controls are selected followed by mapping and 
prioritizing the selected controls taking into account the overlap. The implementation step takes 
into account the guidelines provided by the frameworks for implementation and optimal 
integration.  
Measurement being a requirement for effective security governance, COBIT provides a set of 
tools and techniques for measurement of controls ranging from a simple compliance (complaint 
and  non-complaint), key performance/goal indicators (using quantitative scales), maturity model 
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and the balance score card (BSC). Other measurements used are the heat map (red-amber-green) 
and rating scale. A continuous approach of monitoring involves the use of automated tools to 
record results from measurement on a continual basis to view the trend and take corrective action 
and an external monitoring tool that provides suggestions on continuous improvement of the 
ISSG model. The proposed model being conceptual in nature is not without its limitations. 
Hence, the validation of the model through empirical research (case studies) in different contexts 
and sectors is required to validate it.   
  
8. Conclusion   
Incidents, experiences and technological advances have proved that it is not possible to ensure a 
100% secure IS network in an organisation. The practical option is to ensure optimal IS security 
rather than adequate or maximum IS security. This can be achieved through the use of carefully 
selecting relevant IS control from all domain of IS, prioritize and integrate them to avoid 
duplication and implement them as a continuous cyclical process taking into account the 
dynamic nature of technical advances in IS defense,  threat, and the dynamic nature of the 
organisational external and internal environment.  This ensures a holistic perspective of IS 
security governance through a risk based approach; ensure continuous monitoring through multi 
measurement tools; and monitor the internal and external trends for continuous improvement of 
the model. Generalization of this model requires validation through empirical research (case 
studies) in different sectors of the industry and in different geographical locations.       
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